Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(80)90012-9zbMath0449.90004OpenAlexW2053520229MaRDI QIDQ1147612

Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(80)90012-9

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyneutralityanonymitycollective decision problemdominance- solvable voting schemeimplementation of social choice functionsprivately owned decision power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (13)

Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition ⋮ Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy ⋮ Dominance solvable games and trees ⋮ Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory ⋮ Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees ⋮ Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency ⋮ Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited ⋮ Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function ⋮ Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking

Cites Work

• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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