Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions

DOI10.1007/BF01771425zbMath0451.90008OpenAlexW1996612033MaRDI QIDQ1148199

Shin Ishikawa, Kenjiro Nakamura

Publication date: 1980

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01771425

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamesocial choice functionsrepresentation of characteristic function games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered ⋮ On strong representations of games by social choice functions ⋮ The capacity of a committee ⋮ Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters ⋮ On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions ⋮ Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE OF A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
• Consistent Voting Systems
• A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game
• The independence of game theory of utility theory

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