Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90016-2zbMath0452.90013OpenAlexW2080059028MaRDI QIDQ1148777

Mikio Nakayama

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90016-2

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrianoncooperative gamepublic goodsallocation ruleLindahl equilibriacoincidence conditionsallocation mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Competitive Exchange
• Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria