Double deception: Two against one in three-person games

DOI10.1007/BF02342605zbMath0454.90094MaRDI QIDQ1149889

Steven J. Brams, Frank C. Zagare

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

deceptionmisrepresentation of preferencesthree-person voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (1)

The chairman's paradox revisited

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Stability in Voting
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†

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