Stability of decision systems under majority rule

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90002-2zbMath0457.90007OpenAlexW1997399914WikidataQ56763523 ScholiaQ56763523MaRDI QIDQ1151327

Ariel Rubinstein

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90002-2

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitystable setmajority ruleexistence of equilibriumdynamic systemparadox of votingnon-emptiness theorems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Model theory
• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Stability in Voting
• Stable Sets and Stable Points of Set-Valued Dynamic Systems with Applications to Game Theory
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule