The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
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Publication:1152837
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(81)90002-1zbMath0461.90004OpenAlexW2069453766WikidataQ126850636 ScholiaQ126850636MaRDI QIDQ1152837
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(81)90002-1
monotonicityexistenceuniquenessminimal blocking coalitionanonymous exactly strongly consistent social choice function
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