Single-stage election procedures for large electorates

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(81)90005-7zbMath0461.90005OpenAlexW2029911437MaRDI QIDQ1152838

William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(81)90005-7

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet efficiencyscoring ruleimpartial culturesingle-stage election procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates ⋮ Condorcet's paradox ⋮ The Condorcet criterion and committee selection

Cites Work

• Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
• Unnamed Item

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