Independence of irrelevant expansions

DOI10.1007/BF01769264zbMath0461.90087OpenAlexW2007281560WikidataQ59973148 ScholiaQ59973148MaRDI QIDQ1152858

William Thomson

Publication date: 1981

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769264

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic approachbargainingindependence of irrelevant expansionsirrelevant alternativesNash's solutionutilitarian rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ The Nash solution and independence of revealed irrelevant alternatives ⋮ Two-person bargaining with verifiable information ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims ⋮ The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games ⋮ The Nash solution and relevant expansions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Monotonicity and independence axioms
• A class of solutions to bargaining problems
• The Bargaining Problem
• Nash's Bargaining Solution and Utilitarian Choice Rules
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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