Stable voting schemes

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90011-3zbMath0462.90006OpenAlexW2028639215MaRDI QIDQ1153026

Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90011-3

zbMATH Keywords

manipulationapproval votingvoting by vetothreatcounterthreatpreference misrepresentationprotective stabilitystable voting schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Is it ever safe to vote strategically? ⋮ Salvador Barberà ⋮ Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules ⋮ Implementability via protective equilibria

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes

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