Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting

DOI10.1007/BF00134212zbMath0463.90010MaRDI QIDQ1153828

Donald E. Campbell

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingstrong Nash equilibriumergodic processplurality votingrecurrent statescollective decision mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Stability in Voting
• Algorithms for Social Choice Functions
• Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
• Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Why the Edgeworth Process Assumption Isn't That Bad

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