A stability theorem for symmetrically rational counterplanning

DOI10.1007/BF00935277zbMath0465.90093OpenAlexW1568127036MaRDI QIDQ1154954

S. H. Smith

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00935277

zbMATH Keywords

unique Nash equilibriumstability theoremcounterplanninglinear-quadratic nonzerosum two-person gameprinciple of symmetrical rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• \(C^3\) modeling with symmetrical rationality
• Optimal strategies for \(C^ 3\) problems. V. The incorporation of symmetrical rationality

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