Structural instability of decision majority rules

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90027-1zbMath0471.90010OpenAlexW3123405350MaRDI QIDQ1158070

Graciela Chichilnisky

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90027-1

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitystructural instabilityPareto conditiondecisive majority conditionsocial aggregation rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Community preferences and social choice ⋮ The topological equivalence of the Pareto condition and the existence of a dictator ⋮ Topological social choice ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox

Cites Work

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• Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
• Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Smooth Preferences
• An exact sequence in differential topology

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