An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination

DOI10.1016/0005-1098(81)90069-8zbMath0471.90023OpenAlexW2043247697MaRDI QIDQ1158076

S. H. Smith

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-1098(81)90069-8

zbMATH Keywords

duopolyincentive mechanismStackelberg gamevoluntary cooperationone leaderdecision-dependent information structuregovernment coordinationoptimal coordinationstatic market modeltwo Nash followers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (5)

Research on local government governance and enterprise social responsibility behaviors under the perspective of Cournot duopoly competition: analyzing taxi companies and online car-hailing service companies ⋮ Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents ⋮ Mathematical modeling of China's state-owned enterprises' contract system ⋮ Optimal and near-optimal incentive strategies in the hierarchical control of Markov chains ⋮ Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization

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• Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
• Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
• Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm

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