A note on the perfectness concept and the information structures of games

DOI10.1007/BF01755959zbMath0474.90088MaRDI QIDQ1159089

S. H. Smith

Publication date: 1981

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stability of equilibrium pointssufficient stability conditionsSelten's concept of perfectnessSelten's perfect equilibrium pointslight perturbations on the information structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Non-cooperative games
• Economic Comparability of Information Systems
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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