Semisimple games, enactment power and generalized power indices

DOI10.1007/BF01755960zbMath0474.90095MaRDI QIDQ1159093

Edward W. Packel

Publication date: 1981

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic characterizationpower indicescollective powerenactment powernonnormalized measure of individual powersemisimple games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

On a relative measure of skill for games with chance elements

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
• Transitive permutation groups and equipotent voting rules
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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