Finite \(N\)-person non-cooperative games with unique equilibrium points

DOI10.1007/BF01755957zbMath0479.90090OpenAlexW2051200159MaRDI QIDQ1161689

Victoria L. Kreps

Publication date: 1981

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01755957

zbMATH Keywords

unique equilibriumcompletely mixed strategy \(N\)-tuplefinite \(N\)-person noncooperative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items

Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points, The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria, Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium points in bimatrix games, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining, In memory of Victoria Kreps (3 September 1945--3 March 2021), On game-theoretic characterisation of stochastic independence, Equilibrium points in special n-person games, On Maximal Vector Spaces of Finite Noncooperative Games

Cites Work

• Bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points
• Structure of equilibria in N-person non-cooperative games