Conflict dissolution by reframing game payoffs using linear perturbations
DOI10.1007/BF00934528zbMath0479.90091OpenAlexW2091623149MaRDI QIDQ1161690
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00934528
stabilitydecompositionPareto optimalitylinear perturbationshabitual domainmonotonic gamescollective group interestconflict dissolutionfull cooperationgeneral n-person gamegood reframing conditionsideal gameincentives for adopting a new gamereformulation of cooperative gamesreframing game payoffsself-interest cooperative gamesself-interest maximizationself-interest noncooperative gamesself-interest stable solutionstructural departuretargeted solution
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Cites Work
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