Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90060-9zbMath0479.90010OpenAlexW2014358890MaRDI QIDQ1162261

Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90060-9

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilitystrategyproofnessmisrepresentation of preferencescounterthreatsexact consistencymultivalued social choice functionssocial decision rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
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• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
• On the Possibility of Consistent Voting Procedures
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems

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