Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90044-0zbMath0479.90011OpenAlexW1998399474MaRDI QIDQ1162262

Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90044-0

zbMATH Keywords

liberalismArrow's impossibility theoremcoalitional power structureexistence of a hierarchy of dictatorsgeneralised versionprobabilistic social choiceprobabilistic versions of weak independence of irrelevant alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization ⋮ A projection property and Arrow's impossibility theorem

Cites Work

• Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness
• The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules
• Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle