Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90063-4zbMath0479.90012OpenAlexW2057744447MaRDI QIDQ1162263

Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90063-4

zbMATH Keywords

strategyproofnessstrategic manipulationnon-manipulabilitycounter-threatsk-Pareto rulenon-binary group decision rulesunanimity rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions ⋮ On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules

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• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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