Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90043-9zbMath0479.90013OpenAlexW2053716542MaRDI QIDQ1162265

Manimay Sengupta, Prasanta K. Pattanaik

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90043-9

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcorepairwise comparisonsophisticated votingabsence of non-trivial decision ruleshonest votingundominated voting strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules ⋮ On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures

Cites Work

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• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting

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