Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90041-5zbMath0479.90014OpenAlexW2039614328MaRDI QIDQ1162266

William V. Gehrlein, Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90041-5

zbMATH Keywords

transitivityplurality ruleBorda ruleCondorcet winnerscoring rulearbitrary preferencesCondorcet candidateelections among three candidateslarge electoratesmajority agreementsnormal orthant probabilityrule-lambda ranking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey, Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes, Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021), Condorcet's paradox

Cites Work

• Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives