Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
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Publication:1162267
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90061-0zbMath0479.90015OpenAlexW2042545119MaRDI QIDQ1162267
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90061-0
Condorcet efficiencyCondorcet winnerconstant scoring rulesexact closed form relationsthree element rankingstwo stage constant rules
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