A model of far-sighted electoral competition

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)91083-6zbMath0479.90017OpenAlexW2044772075MaRDI QIDQ1162269

Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)91083-6

zbMATH Keywords

far-sighted electoral competitionsequences of election contestssymmetric steady-state equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

• A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• Finite state Markovian decision processes
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents