Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90009-XzbMath0481.90004OpenAlexW2014805785MaRDI QIDQ1162428

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90009-x

zbMATH Keywords

committee implementation theory blocking power of coalitions cooperative stability cooperative voting core of simple game cores of effectivity functions strong equilibrium concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (87)

Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies ⋮ Strongly consistent two-player game forms ⋮ ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING ⋮ Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization ⋮ GAME FORMATS AS CHU SPACES ⋮ Two-person game forms guaranteeing the stability against commitment and delaying tactics ⋮ Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions ⋮ Stable effectivity functions with an infinity of players and alternatives ⋮ Stability of topological effectivity functions ⋮ A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems ⋮ Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation ⋮ Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization ⋮ ``How characteristic are characteristic functions? ⋮ Effectivity functions and simple games ⋮ Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives ⋮ Stable extensive game forms with perfect information ⋮ Effectivity and power ⋮ Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters ⋮ Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms ⋮ Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization ⋮ On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions ⋮ A note of tight extensive game forms ⋮ Vetoing in social choice with blockings ⋮ Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations ⋮ Perfect graphs are kernel solvable ⋮ Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games ⋮ Binary effectivity rules ⋮ Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games ⋮ On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions ⋮ A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise ⋮ Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice ⋮ Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness ⋮ Self-implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium ⋮ The structure of unstable power mechanisms ⋮ Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms. ⋮ The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form ⋮ Comparative cooperative game theory ⋮ Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium ⋮ Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions ⋮ The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets ⋮ War and peace in veto voting ⋮ Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs ⋮ Deontic logic for strategic games ⋮ Maxmin and minmax for coalitional game forms ⋮ Implementing a public project and distributing its cost ⋮ On strongly consistent social choice functions ⋮ A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games ⋮ Balancing the power to appoint officers ⋮ Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ Implementation by mediated equilibrium ⋮ Acyclic, or totally tight, two-person game forms: characterization and main properties ⋮ An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria ⋮ Decomposing complete edge-chromatic graphs and hypergraphs. 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