Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
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Publication:1162430
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90004-0zbMath0481.90006OpenAlexW2081454819MaRDI QIDQ1162430
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16111/1/Laffont_16111.pdf
balancednessindividual rationalitydominant strategiesNash strategiesGibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theoremimplementation of social choice functionnon-rich environmentsquasi-linear utility functions mechanismsrobustness with respect to coalitions
Related Items (3)
Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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