Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90004-0zbMath0481.90006OpenAlexW2081454819MaRDI QIDQ1162430

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Eric S. Maskin

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16111/1/Laffont_16111.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

balancednessindividual rationalitydominant strategiesNash strategiesGibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theoremimplementation of social choice functionnon-rich environmentsquasi-linear utility functions mechanismsrobustness with respect to coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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