On the robustness of strategy proof mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90003-9zbMath0481.90007OpenAlexW1968658585MaRDI QIDQ1162431

Roger Guesnerie, Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90003-9

zbMATH Keywords

dominant strategyincentive compatible mechanismsGibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theoremfinite-dimensional parametrizationsimplementation of social choice rulesrobustness of strategy proof mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

On the difficulty of eliciting summary information

Cites Work

• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
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