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Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation

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Publication:1162902
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DOI10.1007/BF00133974zbMath0482.90006MaRDI QIDQ1162902

William V. Gehrlein, Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)


zbMATH Keywords

voting proceduresmulticandidate election


Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)


Related Items

The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey, On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser, The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle, Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes, Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates, On probability models in voting theory, Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and proportional lottery rules, Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021), Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons, Research in decision theory: A personal perspective, The Condorcet criterion and committee selection



Cites Work

  • Condorcet Social Choice Functions
  • A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
  • Approval Voting: A 'Best Buy' Method for Multi-Candidate Elections?
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