Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(82)90127-8zbMath0483.90008OpenAlexW2071029157MaRDI QIDQ1163458

Philippe Vincke

Publication date: 1982

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(82)90127-8

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theorempreaggregation methods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Towards a theory of MCDM: Stepping away from social choice theory ⋮ Pointwise aggregation of maps: its structural functional equation and some applications to social choice theory ⋮ Dynamic-R: a ``challenge-free method for rating problem statements ⋮ Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
• Irrelevant Alternatives and Social Welfare
• A Group Preference Axiomatization with Cardinal Utility
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem

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