Note on the core and compensation in collective choice

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)91086-1zbMath0483.90010OpenAlexW2018930836MaRDI QIDQ1163459

Mikio Nakayama

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)91086-1

zbMATH Keywords

simple majority ruleveto playerscore of simple gamebribingmoney as compensatory payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game
• Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible

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