Revelation of preferences for public goods: Aggregation by abelian operations

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90033-3zbMath0485.90003OpenAlexW2058617914MaRDI QIDQ1164519

Pierre Batteau

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90033-3

zbMATH Keywords

aggregationpublic goodsincentive compatible mechanismsAbelian operationsadditively separable utility functionsrevelation of preferencestwo-public-alternative situation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

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