The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90035-7zbMath0485.90004OpenAlexW2013292417MaRDI QIDQ1164520

Taradas Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90035-7

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityoligarchycoalitional powerParetian liberalsprobabilistic group decision rulesprobabilistic social preferencesprobabilistic social welfare functionssubadditive veto power structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle ⋮ The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences ⋮ An axiomatic theory of political representation ⋮ Sophisticated preference aggregation ⋮ Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers

Cites Work

• Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
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