Learning to be rational
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Publication:1164545
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90008-4zbMath0485.90027OpenAlexW2160859839MaRDI QIDQ1164545
Lawrence E. Blume, David A. Easley
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/24022
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Price dynamics in overlapping generations environments ⋮ Recursive equilibrium with price perfect foresight and a minimal state space ⋮ The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Bayesian learning and convergence to rational expectations ⋮ Biased learning under ambiguous information ⋮ Bayesian learning behaviour and the stability of equilibrium forecasts ⋮ The rationality of expectations formation ⋮ Uniformly self-justified equilibria ⋮ Heterogeneous distribution of information and convergence to rational expectations equilibrium in a partial equilibrium model ⋮ Introduction to the stability of rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Learning in mis-specified models and the possibility of cycles ⋮ Adjustment costs, learning, and indeterminacy ⋮ Evolution and market behavior ⋮ Properties of equilibrium asset prices under alternative learning schemes ⋮ Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game ⋮ Consistent expectations equilibria and learning in a stock market ⋮ On learning and rational expectations in an overlapping generations model ⋮ A pseudo-Bayesian model in financial decision making with implications to market volatility, under- and overreaction ⋮ Rational expectations equilibrium: An alternative approach ⋮ Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium ⋮ Existence and stability of rational expectation-equilibria in a simple overlapping generation model ⋮ Expectations equilibria with dispersed forecasts ⋮ Optimality and natural selection in markets ⋮ Convergence of Bayesian learning to general equilibrium in mis-specified models. ⋮ Learnig rational expectations: The finite state case
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