Voting and paying for public goods: An application of the theory of the core

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90036-9zbMath0485.90028OpenAlexW2084635187MaRDI QIDQ1164547

Lester G. Telser

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90036-9

zbMATH Keywords

votingmajority coalitionnonemptiness theorempaying for public goodstheory of the core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (2)

Cost Sharing in a Condo Under Law’s Umbrella ⋮ Game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale

Cites Work

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• Power and public goods
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• Power and taxes in a multi-commodity economy
• Supportable cost functions for the multiproduct firm
• Optimal denominations for coins and currency
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Power and Taxes
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods

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