We can't disagree forever
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Publication:1165148
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90099-0zbMath0486.90031OpenAlexW2016758384MaRDI QIDQ1165148
John D. Geanakoplos, Herakles M. Polemarchakis
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90099-0
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