Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90055-5zbMath0486.90094OpenAlexW1566170193MaRDI QIDQ1165169

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90055-5

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumbargaining gamesrisk-dominancepayoff-dominanceHarsanyi-Selten solution theorynet stratetic distancesprimitive equilibrium pointsuniformly perturbed game form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

The tracing procedure: A self-correcting reasoning procedure, Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining, Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. II: Analysis of specific bargaining games, Equilibrium selection in the one seller and many buyers-game, List of Publications: John C. Harsanyi, December 1997, Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games

Cites Work

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• Analysis of a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information
• Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. II: Analysis of specific bargaining games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• A solution concept for \(n\)-person noncooperative games
• The Bargaining Problem
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Two-Person Cooperative Games