Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(81)90056-9zbMath0487.90011OpenAlexW2077440989MaRDI QIDQ1165757

Shmuel Nitzan, Peter J. Coughlin

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90056-9

zbMATH Keywords

probabilistic votingelectoral competitionssimple voting gamesdirectional electoral equilibriageneral existence results for equilibrialocal electoral equilibriasocial log-likelihood function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

A group majority voting model of public good provision, Pareto optimality in spatial voting models, On the restrictiveness of monotonic scalable choice in probabilistic choice models, A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters, A theory of voting in large elections, Endogenously determined price rigidities, On optimal group claims at voting in a stochastic environment, Reputational dynamics in spatial competition, A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition, Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting, Incumbent reputations and ideological campaign contributions in spatial competition, Abstention causes bifurcations in two-party voting dynamics., Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models, The dynamics of locally adaptive parties under spatial voting, Candidate behavior under mixed motives, A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences, Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models, Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models, Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality, On the independence from irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Robustness of the median voter result
• Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
• Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets
• Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
• Differential Topology
• Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium
• Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives