Coalition formation in the triad when two are weak and one is strong

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(80)90003-7zbMath0488.90087OpenAlexW4239765123MaRDI QIDQ1166441

James P. Kahan, Amnon Rapoport

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(80)90003-7

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsbargaining setcoalition formationtriadsidepaymentsdegree of powerone strong playersingle parameter alpha- power modelsuperadditive 3-person characteristic function gamestwo weak playerstype of communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Mathematical psychology (91E99)

Related Items (4)

Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values ⋮ A cooperative game with envy ⋮ A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model ⋮ The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts

Cites Work

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• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• When you don't need to join: The effects of guaranteed payoffs on bargaining in three-person cooperative games
• \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
• The Effects of Communication and Information Availability in an Experimental Study of a Three-Person Game
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle

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