No minimally reasonable collective-choice process can be strategy-proof

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90006-3zbMath0489.90013OpenAlexW2017333516MaRDI QIDQ1167045

Thomas Schwartz

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90006-3

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilitystrategy-proofnessnondictatorshipcollective-choice processunanimity-reduction condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
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