Economic planning based on social preference functions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(81)90006-8zbMath0489.90015OpenAlexW2056504814MaRDI QIDQ1167048

Kim Hang Kim, Fred W. Roush

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(81)90006-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutioneconomic planninginterpersonal comparison of utilitiessocial preference functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

The publications of Ki Hang Kim ⋮ The optimal progressive income tax. The existence and the limit tax rates

Cites Work

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• Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms
• Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization
• The Nash Social Welfare Function
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• A Welfare Function Using "Relative Intensity" of Preference

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