Game theoretical analysis of wage bargaining in a simple business cycle model

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90036-2zbMath0489.90032OpenAlexW2021068329MaRDI QIDQ1167054

Reinhard Selten, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2909701

zbMATH Keywords

infinite time horizonsubgame consistencymultiplier-accelerator type modelsimple business cycle model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

BACKWARD INDUCTION OR FORWARD REASONING? – AN EXPERIMENT OF STOCHASTIC ALTERNATING OFFER BARGAINING ⋮ Equilibrium selection in the one seller and many buyers-game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bargaining under strike: A differential game view
• The Bargaining Problem
• A Business Cycle Model with Organized Labor Considered

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