Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90003-8zbMath0489.90089OpenAlexW1994518527MaRDI QIDQ1167070

Norman Schofield

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90003-8

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitykernelbargaining setB1- bargaining setB2-bargaining setformation of surplus coalitionsgovernment portfolio distributionparliamentary situationvoting games with side payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items

Smooth social choice ⋮ Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining ⋮ The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice

Cites Work

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• When you don't need to join: The effects of guaranteed payoffs on bargaining in three-person cooperative games
• Generalised bargaining sets for cooperative games
• A Method for Computing the Kernel of n-Person Games
• Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Existence theorem for the bargaining set 𝑀₁^{(𝑖)}