Individual strategy and manipulation of issues

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(81)90004-4zbMath0492.90002OpenAlexW2037905871MaRDI QIDQ1168199

Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(81)90004-4

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilitysincere votingsophisticated votingdominant strategy equilibriumgroup decision functionsstrategic sponsoring of alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Choice and Revealed Preference
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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