Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90031-2zbMath0492.90003OpenAlexW2004088905MaRDI QIDQ1168200

Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90031-2

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilityapproval votingdichotomous preferencesdominant strategyadmissible ballotsmulti-valued social choice functionsvariable electorate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
• Manipulation of social decision functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• Social Choice and Individual Ranking I
• Social Choice and Individual Rankings II
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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