Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(81)90035-1zbMath0492.90005OpenAlexW1972869950MaRDI QIDQ1168201

S. Singh

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90035-1

zbMATH Keywords

existence resultsstrategic votingbinarinessgroup decision functionlimited sovereigntymanipulability of preferencesminimal binariness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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