Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. II: Analysis of specific bargaining games

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90074-9zbMath0492.90091OpenAlexW1577824536MaRDI QIDQ1168224

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90074-9

zbMATH Keywords

tradebargaining gamesrisk dominanceunanimity gamesone sellerHarsanyi-Selten solution theorybargaining with incomplete informationcomputation of solutionseveral buyerstrading games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items

Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Analysis of a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information
• Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• A solution concept for \(n\)-person noncooperative games
• The Bargaining Problem
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Two-Person Cooperative Games