On Pareto-efficiency and the no-envy concept of equity
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Publication:1168875
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(81)90037-5zbMath0493.90009OpenAlexW2005736493MaRDI QIDQ1168875
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90037-5
Pareto efficiencyimpossibility theoremcollective choice ruleChernoff's axiom of choice consistencyFoley equity
Related Items (13)
Beyond pareto optimality: The necessity of interpersonal cardinal utilities in distributional judgements and social choice ⋮ Reflections on Arrow's research program of social choice theory ⋮ Inequality‐averse well‐being measurement ⋮ Envy-free rights assignments and self-oriented preferences ⋮ Equity, efficiency and rights in social choice ⋮ No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality ⋮ Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities ⋮ Efficiency first or equity first? Two principles and rationality of social choice ⋮ Lexicographic compositions of multiple criteria for decision making ⋮ Choice functions and weak Nash axioms ⋮ Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces? ⋮ To Envy or To Be Envied? Refinements of the Envy Test for the Compensation Problem ⋮ Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off
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- On the concept of fairness
- A revised concept of distributional equity
- Weak path independence
- Pitfalls in the theory of fairness
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Some formal models of grading principles
- Social Choice Theory: The Single-Profile and Multi-Profile Approaches
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice
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