Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(80)90004-9zbMath0494.90009OpenAlexW1986240636MaRDI QIDQ1169386

Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(80)90004-9

zbMATH Keywords

concepts of strategyproofnessresolute social decision functionssinglecavednesssinglepeakedness of preferencesstrategic misrevelation of preferencesweighted majority voting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
• A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule

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