Cooperative games with large cores

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Publication:1169415

DOI10.1007/BF01755727zbMath0494.90096MaRDI QIDQ1169415

William W. Sharkey

Publication date: 1982

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)




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