Social choice rules and real-valued representations

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90123-0zbMath0495.90005OpenAlexW2117746731MaRDI QIDQ1169914

Kevin W. S. Roberts

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90123-0

zbMATH Keywords

social choice rulesreal-valued representations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction ⋮ Social evaluation functionals with an arbitrary set of alternatives ⋮ Welfarism on economic domains

Cites Work

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• A general possibility theorem for group decision rules with Pareto- transitivity
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions